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In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
DORIS V\THITE BAGLEY, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
and Cross-Appellant, 
vs. 
SOCONY MOBIL OIL COMP ANY, 
INC., a N mv York corporation, 
Defendant-Appellant, 
and Cross-Respondent. 
RESPONDENT'S AND 
CROSS-A PPELLAN'l1'S BRII~F 
Case No. 
11444 
S'l1 A '11l~MENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is a suit by lessor claiming lessee has improper-
ly held over on a service station lease as a result of 
lessee's failure to renew for which lessor claims lessee 
should be liable for treble damages. Lessor further 
claims that the lessee has breached the lease during its 
period of exist(•nce. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOvVER COURT 
Because of the extensive nature of the pleadings, 
tlwir importance to this appeal, their complicated na-
ture and in view of the fact that two different summary 
judgments have been rendered in the lower court, which 
snmmar~· j11dg-m0nts are the sole issues on this appeal, 
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the pleadings will be set forth in detail with an indica-
tion of their disposition. The plaintiff's initial complaint 
set forth two causes of action. The first cause of action 
alleged that the plaintiff considered the options to re-
new, which were contained in the lease, as continuing 
offers and that she had revoked said offers and that 
therefore the options to renew could not be validl>· 
exercised by the lessee. The second cause of action 
sounded in fraud, claiming that there had been a material 
misrepresentation which had motivated the original 
lessor to enter into the lease. Lessor then filed a fin;t 
amended complaint (R. 27). This first amended com-
plaint incorporated the first two causes of action of the 
original complaint hy reference and set forth a third 
cause of action claiming that the lessee had improperly 
charged lessor hy withholding rent payments for im-
provements made on the premises. Lessor claimed that 
the lessee should actually he resonsible for paying for 
those improvt>ments. A fourth cause of action was also 
included allt>ging that the lessee had trespassed on prop-
rrt>- adjacent to that JH'OJWrty which was demist>d in 
the lease. .Jndge Ellett granted summary judgment in 
behalf of the defendant on tlw plaintiff's first and sPcond 
camws of action (R. 72). 1'lw plaintiff's third cause of 
action was dismissed with prejudice by stipulation (R. 
81). A propost>d sC'cond amended complaint was filefl 
(R. 82) with a motion to allow tlw filing of the second 
amend<>d complaint (R. 97), hut the mattt>r was nPY<'I' 
considPrE'd h~· tlw eourt and no order was entE'rPd allm,·-
ing the filing of th<> proposP<l se('on<l anwnded complaint. 
A rnotion to allo"· th<> fi I ing of a third amended 
complaint was filed (R. 98) and an order was entered 
allowing the filing of tht> third anwnded complaint (R. 
~l9). The third am<c'ndud complaint (R. 101) listed as 
tlH· first thr<'P ca11ses of action those ·which had been 
dispmwd of prnviom.:1:-·. A fonrth canse of action claim-
<'d that thPl'P had bPen a material alteration of tlw lease 
ll\" tlw lPsse(' which had voided the lease. 'rhP complaint 
s• t torth a fifth cansP of action ·which alleged that the 
l('~;c.:<<', : ;oron:-· ::\Iohil Oil, Inc., had assigned the lease 
:u1d (1,.: ;-;11el1 thP assigneP, E. r..:;. T<Try, \\·as the only party 
1d10 eonld n'll\'Y1" the leasv and that Mobil Oil Company'~ 
attempt to do ::-;o '':as inYalid. 'I'h<• ca11s<'s of action al-
lPgPd treble damages for wrongfully holding over. 'rhe 
complaint contained a sixth cause of action alleging that 
the lPssee had contracted not to renew the lease by im-
plied contract and estop1wl and claimed treble damages 
["or wrongfully holding over. The seventh cause of ac-
tion of said complaint claimed that Mobil Oil Company 
was wrongfnll.\· occupying the building upon the premises 
dPmis<'d for the reason that the building was not demised 
"·ith the }ffPmis('S and that the 1Psse0 was not paying 
additional reasonahh~ rental for the building. An eighth 
carnw of action allPged a trespass in that it claimed that 
tlH:' lessPP was occupying 7 42 square feet of adjacent 
prn1wrt:-· lwlonging to the kssor and not demist>d in the 
l«mw. A ninth cansP of action claimed that the lessee 
h:· occ111J>·ing more pro1wrty than was dPmisPd in the 
IPasP hrPacli0d. tlw lPasP and that the 10asP was therP-
fon, s11h.i<'d to frrmination. A tenth carn;p of action 
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alleged lack of mutuality for the reason that the lease 
purports to bind the lessor for a potential period of 25 
years while it allows the lessee the right to terminate 
upon giving 30 days' notice and that the additional bur-
dens imposed by the alteration were also indicative of a 
lack of mutuality. An eleventh cause of action alleged 
an implied covenant in the lease for the lessor and lPssee 
to mutually share profits eminating from the 01wration 
of the station. 
Judge Hanson granted a summary judgment (R 
187) in favor of the plaintiff on her third amendPd com-
plaint on the sixth cause of action, the eighth cause of 
action, the tenth cause of action and the eleventh cause 
of action as to the question of liability and reservPd the 
question of damages for trial. In the same judgment 
Judge Hanson granted a summary judgment in favor of 
the defrndant on the sevPnth cause of action. 
In the pretrial order (R. 194) Judge Croft entered 
a judgment denying trPhle damages. A judgment (R. 
213) was granted in favor of the plaintiff in the amonnt 
of $7,517.00. Tlw findings of fact (R. 212) contain a 
mistake in tlw first paragraph. In that paragraph 
$280.00 lH'r month shonld read $180.00 per month. 
Tlw plaintiff-respondent and cross-appellant agr<'t'S 
with thP ch·frndant-appl'llant and eross-respondent's 
5 
statement of facts in the mam as far as it goes. She 
disagrees with certain pertinent aspects of that fact 
statement. Plaintiff entered into one not two written 
lease agre(_•ments (Exhibit P-1). The other document 
·which ·was denominated as a lease (Plaintiff's deposition 
Exhibit No. 2) was a summary of the primary lease for 
n'cording purposes and did not in any way add or de-
tract from the terms of the lease (Plaintiff's Exhibit 
Xo. 1) 
TlwrP is no evidence in tlw record to the effect that 
th' <11qn·ovPnwnts on tlw property wen-' not completed 
until May 1, 1955. 
1'Jw lease with respect to termination provided as 
follows: 
"7. Lessee may use the demised premises 
for the dispensing of petroleum products and for 
the conduct of a service station business thereon 
and for any other lawful purpose. In the event 
of the condPmnation of said premises or any part 
thereof, or in the event the full use of said prem-
ises or any portion thereof in the conduct of a 
su1wr service station business is interfered 'vith 
or handicapped by any law, ordinance, or rule or 
ret,rulation of any governmental office or body 
acting under authority or cover of authority, or 
b~- order of any court, lessee may at its option 
terminate this lrase upon 30 days' written notice 
to the lessor. It is also agreed that in the event 
at any tinw or from time to time the demised 
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premises cease to be advantageous in the sole 
discretion of the lessee for the dispensing of pe-
troleum products, then lessee may at its option 
terminate this lease upon thirty (30) days' writ-
ten notice to lessor and paying to lessor an 
amount equal to that received by lessor as rental 
for calendar month next preceding the month in 
which notice of termination is given. The waiver 
of any provision hereof shall not be deemed a 
waiver of any other provision or provisions here-
of, or of lessee's right to subsequently terminate 
this lease because of the occurrence of one or 
more of the conditions or circumstances herein 
set forth." 
At the time the lease was executed each paragraph 
was stamped with an initial stamp in black i;nk and 
initialed by Lavine H. White in her own behalf and by 
B. F. Ball for and in behalf of the lessee. The lease at 
the time it was so executed provided in paragraph 20 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1): 
"Lessee agrees to supervise the construction 
and installation of a service station upon the de-
mised premises including buildings and equip-
ment in accordance with plans and specifications 
first approved in writing by both parties, ... " 
At a later date the lessee unilaterally added para-
graph 24 which does not bear the initials of Lavine H. 
White and which bears a different initial stamp (Plain-
tiff's Exhibit No. 1) and which paragraph is quoted as 
follows: 
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"24. K otwithstanding tlw provisions of para-
graph 20 a hove, lessor agre<·s to canse to be con-
struetPd on tlw demisPd lH"<•mises impron•ments 
and faciliti<>s and <"quipment adequate for the op-
eration of a gasoline sPrvice station for tlw sale 
of gasoline and otlwr iwtroleum iirodncts at a 
co::;t of arlproximately twenty thousand dollars 
( $20,000.00), said amount to he in addition to 
l<>ss<•<>\ contribution outlined in paragraph 20 
above. l n tlw <'VPnt lPssor is unable to complete 
<"Onstruc-tion of im1n·ov<•Jll<•11ts within nindy (90 
da.\·~:) after an PX<'cnted copy of this lease is de-
liYn<'d to !Pssor, it is mutually agreed that lessee 
ma~·, at its option, complete construction of said 
sP1Tic<· station and h" r<'imhun;ecl for such ex-
1wn:ws from }ll"Oceeds from the loan to be secured 
h:,· lessor and rPfrrred to in paragraph 19 above." 
Paragraph 24 imposed an additional burden upon 
tlw ]('Ssor which ,,·as not contPmplat('d at the time the 
lPssor agreed to accept three hundred dollars ($300.00) 
a month and was accepted by the lessor only subject to 
tlw condition that an additional amount of compensation 
lw rPcPi1·Pd in proportion to the value of the investment 
mnd<> h~- tlw lessor (Deposition of Doris ·white Bagley, 
pp. 19, 20). This testimony went unchallenged through-
out th(~ proceedings. Promises "·ere continually made by 
tlH· lPssc•p throngl10nt the iwriod of thP lease that the 
lPssor would lw reimlrnrsed at some point for the im-
Jll"OV('lll<'nbi \\·liich had lwen pnt on fop station by the 
lussor (Doris \Vhite Hag!Py's deposition, pp. 1!) through 
~'.2). 
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On October 17, 1963, the following letter \Vas sent 
to .Mrs. Doris Bagley, the lessor herein: 
"Dear .Mrs. Bagley: .Management has report-
ed on the proposal we submitted on the property 
at 2950 East 33rd South, Salt Lake City, L"tah. 
"As proposed with your consent, the outlim· 
of the proposal vrns as follows: 
"l. Firm up two five-year options to Pnah!P 
you to horrow money on the leasP. 
"2. Rental of l.5 cents per gallon with a 
minimum of $265.00 per month. The 1.5 cenb 
per gallon would be computed on an annual gal-
lonage hasis. 
"3. Mobil Oil Company to assume all main-
tenance. 
"In factoring out the proposed rental versus 
rental .Mobil is presently paying, it was felt that 
the present lease arrangement should not he 
changed. 
''Howe\-er, they are willing to propos<:> for 
consideration a firming up of two five-year op-
tions and assuming maintenance on the basis of 
a rental of a flat $265.00 per month. 
"I know that management has carefully ron-
sidered our proposal, and it would be appreciated 
if yon ·would givP their recommendation your con-
sideration. 
'"Please advise me as soon as possible, as thl' 
proposal is being 1wnckd until we hear from you. 
Sincer<'l.'- yours, H. 0. Nichols." (R. 152). 
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Tt was v<>ry clear from the record that the only basis 
1111011 which Mobil would n•new the lease vvas at a lesser 
rental amount. 
At page 40 of the Nichols' deposition the following 
statement is found: 
"Q Isn't it trne then that in your conversa-
tion \\'ith Mrs. Hagle)', in regard to this letter, 
that this proposal was t1w only way that 8ocony 
would <kal with h<'r? 
A Right." 
Referring to the $265.00-per-month rental figure in the 
letter at page 41 of the deposition Nichols testified as 
follows: 
"Q In other words, this is based, back to our 
c·onversation, is that was all she was going to get? 
A '11 hat's rig-ht." 
This was Mohil's proposal that they were willing to 
pay at hest $265.00 per month in order to continue in the 
premises after the expiration of the initial period (R. 
153 throngh 161). Mr. Nichols testified in his deposition 
( R. 15-1-) as follmvs: 
10 
"A No. This letter was presented on a basis 
of what we were able to do under the present 
gallonage of the station." 
After receiving the H. 0. Nichols letter and after 
discussions the lessor sent a letter to the lessee indicating 
that she was expecting that the lessee would in fact 
terminate at the end of 120 months (R. 158). Mobil knew 
that it was the lessor's intention to borrow money hased 
upon a further lease commitment. This is demonstrated 
from page 34 of the deposition of Harold Nichols, an 
agent of Mobil. He states at lines 12 through 15: 
"Q Now let's go back to the history. What 
prompted this particular letter~ 
A Because the Whites asked us to firm up 
two five-year options in order for them to borrow 
1noney." 
The foregoing testimony is completely inconsistent 
with the statement found on page 4 of the appellant'~ 
brief quoted as follmvs: 
"The record is without evidence to show de-
fendant made any representations not to nnrw 
the lease ... " 
Appellant's statPment with respect to this fact1wl 
issue as to whether or not there is evidencP in t110 rpeonl 
of Mobil's expression of its intent to r0new the lPa~<' 
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is contravened by the respondent in the foregoing and 
the appellant's statement does not represent a fair re-
slrnH~ of the evidence in the record. It presents none of 
the evidence favorable to the judgment and this failure 
to prevent any of tllE~ evidence favorable to the respond-
ent makes that which is presented of questionable value. 
(Donqlns v. Duvall, 304 P.2d 373, 5 Utah 2d 429, (195G).) 
rl'he ap1)ellant refers to the fact that plaintiff did 
not n'cord in tlw record evidence to demonstrate that 
slw ddrimentally relied upon the representations re-
frn<>d to ahoV('. In this r<>s1wct the iilaintiff admits that 
tlwre are C(~rtain shortcomings in this regard, lmt <'X-
rmws h('I'SPlf for two rPasons; first, the entire scope of 
the discussion at the motion for summary judgment pre-
supposed that counsel for both parties were assuming 
as a fact that the loan had been secured by Doris Bagley 
which ~was of a large and substantial amount beyond that 
which would he paid by the current monthly rentals based 
upon her assumption that she had secured a new lease 
to third parties. This fact did not seem to be questioned 
h~r th0 defendant and plaintiff on the basis of excusable 
neglect asks the Court to accept her affidavits in this 
rPgard at the presPnt time. The second reason the Court 
sl1ould disn'gard any shortcoming in this connection is 
that there was no prejudicial error suffered by the de-
fendant for the reason that there is no legitimate factual 
disputt~ as to whether or not the plaintiff actually secur-
ed t11t> larger loan n~ferred to and a new trial on that 
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issue would most certainly result m a finding to that 
effect. The record reflects that the plaintiff would hav(~ 
been able to secure a new lease had the premises bePn 
vacated at thn end of the initial period (plaintiff's dep-
·t· ')!':) OSl 10n, p. ~•) . 
In the plaintiff's third amended complaint in the 
sixth cause of action the following paragraphs are found 
(R. 107) : 
"7. The plaintiff relying upon the statl>rnPnt 
of the lessee did seek a new future lessee and did 
obtain a commitment to rent the property for 
$600.00 JWr month. 
''8. That in reliance upon the statenwnts of 
the defendant, the plaintiff did negotiate a loan 
based upon the assurance that she would have an 
income of $600.00 per month from the snbjPet 
premises which income would come from the m•w 
lessee who was obtained in view of the deft.ndant 
Socony Mobil's represt·ntation that they wen• not 
going to exPrcise their ovtion to ren(:'W the IP<U.:P. 
"~. That the loan which ·was obtained did 
commit the• plaintiff to make payments in exces:; 
of an amount ·which she could reasonably va» 
based upon the amount of income which she n·-
Ct>iV<'S from tlw dPf Pndanh; nnder thP pres<>llt ar-
rang(·ll1Pnt." 
11 0 this all(·gntion th<' defendant-r<'SJlOndent in its an 1\ ('l' 
to plaintiff\; third amended eomplaint at page 1 '.2:i ol' 
the, record stated as follows: 
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"5. Has insufficient information to admit or 
dt:my the allegations of paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 
and therefore denies the same." 
The record does not contain any factual demonstra-
tion that the plaintiff ever received personally a notice 
that tlw defendant vvished to exercise its option to 
renew the lease and the record does not demonstrate any 
fadual proof that the notice was sent to the address 
lish·d in the lease. The record does not contain any 
factual proof that the notice ·which was sent was sent 
to an nddrt>ss at which the ddendant was residing at 
the tii:ll' tlH' notiCl' l\'aS cleliH'I"Pd. 
The Llt-'fendant leased the Iffemises in question to one 
E. E. Terry for a period which extended longer than the 
prime period under the lease (R. 61, Plaintiff's Exhibit 
No. 1). 
ARG-CMEN'r 
POINT I 
THERE IS AMPLE EVIDENCE OF AN IMPLIED CON-
TRACT BETWEEN PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT TO THE 
EFFECT THAT DEFENDANT WOULD NOT RENEW AND 
EXTEND THE LEASE, AND THERE IS AMPLE EVIDENCE 
OF CONDUCT ON THE PART OF DEFENDANT WHICH 
ESTOPPED IT FROM RENEWING AND EXTENDING THE 
SAME. 
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The extensive statement of facts includes ample 
evidence supporting the legal conclusion that an implil'd 
contract existed whereby the defendant was prPvente<l 
from rene~wing its lease. The case of Chandfor v. Boacli, 
319 P.2d 776, Cal.App. (1968), insofar as it is in point, 
actually supports the plaintiff's case more than it does 
the defendant's. The issue involn'd was the proprit't~- of 
instructing the jury that the novelty and correctnPss of 
an idea were essential to the creation of a contract hy 
implication to pay for the idea. The court held that thP 
instruction was improper but in the process cited nunwr-
ous statutory provisions of the California Code defining 
implied contracts. These statutory provisions are to a 
large extent a reduction of the common law to statnt<> 
and are cited as follo,vs in order to rrlate them to the 
case hrfore the Conrt: 
The California Civil Code, Section 1619, pro-
vides as follows: 
"A contract is either express or implied." 
SPction 1620 providPs: 
"An exprt>ss contract is one, the terms of 
which ar<> stat<><l in words." 
S<>etion Hi21 providPs: 
"An implied-in-fact contract is one, the exist-
encP and terms of \rhich are manifrskd by con-
duct.'' 
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Section 1584 provides: 
"Performance of the conditions of proposal, 
or the acceptance of the conditions offered with a 
proposal is an acceptance of the proposal." 
Section 1589 provides: 
"A voluntary acceptance of the benefit of a 
transaction is equivalent to a consent to all the 
obligations arising from it, so far as the facts are 
known, or onght to be known to the person accept-
ing." 
Sud ion Hi();) JH'O\'idPs: 
"Any benefit conferred, or agreed to be con-
ferred, upon the prornisor, by any other person 
to which the promisor is not lawfully entitled, or 
any prejudice suffered, [emphasis added] or 
agreed to be snff ered, by such person, other than 
such as he is at the time of consent lawfully bound 
to suffer, as an inducement to the promisor, is a 
good consideration for a promise." 
Certainly a prejudice has been suffered within the 
meaning of this code section by the plaintiff in the above-
cntitled action. By definition this prejudice constitutes a 
valid consideration in order to support the implied con-
tract found hy the low<:>r conrt in the instant case. 
"An existing legal obligation resting upon the 
promisor, or a moral obligation originating in some 
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benefit conferred upon the promisor, or prejudice 
siiffered by the promisee, [emphasis added] is also 
a good consideration for a promise, to an extent 
corresponding with the extent of the obligation, 
but no further or otherwise." · 
Likewise this provision presents a theory adequate to 
support the finding of the lower court in the instant cast'. 
The detrimental reliance of plaintiff herein upon th" 
statement by Mobil to the_. effect that it would not re-
new the lease constituted sufficient consideration to imply 
a contract not to do so. 
In the case of Kelly v. Richards, et al., 83 P.2d 731, 
95 Utah 560 (1938), at page 743 the court stated: 
"This estoppel arises when one by his acts, 
or admissions, or by his silence when he ought to 
speak out, intentionally or through culpable negli-
gence induces another to believe facts to exist and 
such other rightfully relies and acts on such belief, 
so that he will be prejudiced if the former is per-
mitted to deny the Pxistence of such facts. 1t con-
sists in holding for the truth a representation act-
<>d upon, when the person who made it, or his 1n·i-
vies, seek to den:' its truth, and to deprive th(• 
party ·who has acted upon it of the benefit oh-
tai1wd." 
Both the above-qnoted section and that section of tlw 
cast:' qnoh,cl in tlw defondant's brief from the same ea:-;P 
d<>monstrat<• that tlw necessary ('lPments have bP0n rn<'t 
hy thP plaintiff. rJ1Ju• defendant had reasonahlP grounds 
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to think that lwcause of its representation the plaintiff 
would change her position because of the facts stated 
Parlier in this brief. First, she indicated in her deposi-
tion that slw could rent the station for more money and 
that sh<~ had indicated this to the defendant. Also, in the 
dPposition of l\fr. Nichols, a representative of the defend-
ant, he stated that the reason the plaintiff wished to firm 
11p the two additional five-.\Tear options was for the pnr-
posl' of borrowing rnom'.\T based upon the lease as security. 
It would only haw been logical for the defendant's agent 
to l1uw al:'.:iLlll<_'<l that npon his making a statement to 
th" plaintiff to tlw dfrct that tht•y ·were not in a position 
to re1ww the l<~ase 1wcansl~ of its low gallonage. that the 
plaintiff would i1mnediately take steps in or<ler to secure 
a new tenant and to negotiate the loan which she told the 
uefendant she was going to negotiate. In the Petty v. 
Gindy Manufacturing Corporation case, 404 P.2d 30, 17 
Utah 2d 32 (1965), also cited by defendant, this Court 
in addition to those sections cited by defendant stated the 
following at page 31: 
'' ... Section 90 of the Restatement of Contracts 
as follows: 
"A promise which the promisor [Gindy] should 
n~asonably expect to induce action or forbearance 
of a definite and substantial character on the part 
of the promisee [Petty] and which does induce 
snch adion or forbearance is binding if injustice 
can bP avoided only by the enforcement of the 
prornisP.'' 
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The court stated that this section ·was being used hy 
the court as a criterion to determine the case. In that 
case the court affirrned the lo-wer court's decision denying 
relief to tlw promisee and stated at page 31: 
"In such circumstances we review the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the findings." 
In the present case the court found in favor of tht.> plain-
tiff and the Court in this case should likewise reiww the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the findings. \\'p 
·would suggest to the Conrt that the instant case }ffovid<>~ 
a mnch clearer case in favor of granting relief to the 
promisee for the reason that equity in good conseienC!' 
can onl~' clearly he served in the instant case if the plain-
tiff is allowed the relief prayed for, the reason being that 
she was reasonably entitled to rely upon the promisP rnadP 
by Mr. Nichols in his letter and in his oral statenwnts to 
her to the effect that the lease would not be' renewed. 1 t 
·was a clearcut and concise' promise concerning a speci fie 
and defined act from which the defendant would allstain, 
that is, the nmewing of the contract. There can b(• mi 
question that the l'Pcord accurately reflPcts the fact thal 
this was indeed tlw lJosition of the dPfendant. 
In th<' ]H'PS(•nt cas<• if any uncertainty (•xists ill tlw 
language of the contract, the holding in Charlto11 r. 
I-Jacket, :-3tJO P.2d 17fi, 1Utah2d 389 (19Gl), sltonld ht> :ql-
plied. In that C'ase tlw conrt held that 1\'lwn there is s1 (']1 
unc<'rtaint~· in thP langna,":<' of a contract, it is the im·r-
ogatiw of tlw trial co11rt to dd('l1llirn• tlH" in·opt'r intet·-
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pn•tation to he placPd upon th<' transaction in the light of 
tlw <·,·id('nC<'; and also to dd('nnine wliether tlH~ plaintiff 
aeted n•asonahly und<>r the circumstances. Here where 
Own• were undisputc•d facts thC' court was well \vithin its 
discn~tion in finding as it did and tlw Comt in this case 
should uphold the lower court as it upheld the lower court 
i11 th<' Petf:IJ case even though tlw pffect would he to give 
thP prornisPe in the instant case rather than the promisor 
as in 111<' P,·tfy C'ase the rPli1•f for which it pray<'<l. 
TIH·re an• almost as man:· d<·f'initions of t>xpn•ss and 
i111pliPd eontrads as tlt<'I'<' arP eases involving the inter-
pretation of tlwse \rnrds. In addition to the foregoing 
statutory definitions which have been cited in conjunction 
with the Chandler case, the following common law defini-
tions aT<' fn·quently quotC'd (Black's Law Dictionary, P. 
''<) ~ ) .), ;) : 
Contract. 
"An express contract is an actual agreement 
ol' the parties, the tt>rms of which are openly ut-
t<'red or deelared at the tinw of making it, being 
i-;tated in distinct and explicit language, either oral-
1:· or in \niting." 2 BL. Comm. -143; 2 Kent, Comm. 
-1::)0; Liiw 1". Rosse, 10 Ohio ±14, 36 Am Dec. 95; 
A. J. rmcwr Co. v. Josc1Jh, 184 Ind. 228; 108 
X.K 774, 775; 111 re Piera, Bidlcr & P1:crcc lllfg. 
Co., D.C.X.Y., 231 FPd. 312, 318. 
··An implied contract is one not created or evi-
d(,llC<'d by tlw explicit agreement of the parties, 
lint infrnNl liy tlH• Jim·. as a matt0r of reason and 
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justice from their acts or conduct, the circnm-
stances surrounding the transaction making it a 
reasonable, or even a necessary, assumption that 
the contract existed between them by tacit under-
standing." ill ill er' s A ppcal, 100 Pa. 5Gi), 45 Am. 
Rep. 39-±; Landon v. Kansas City Gas Comzwny, 
C.C.A. Kan., 10 Fed. 2d 263, 26G; Caldwell 1_1. Mis-
souri State Life Ins. Co., 148 Ark. 474, 230 S.\V. 
5GG, 568; Cameron to U sc of Cameron, v. Ey1w11, 
332 Pa. 529, 3 A.2d 423, 424; American La France 
Fire Eugine Co., to Use of American LaFrr111ce & 
Foamite Inditstries v. Borough of Shr11r111dooh, 
C.C.A. Pa., 115 Fed. 2d 8!JG, 807. 
"Implied contracts are sometimes di\'id\•<l into 
those 'implied in fact' and those 'implied in law,' 
the former being con•red hy the definition ju:-;t 
given, while the latt\•r are obligations irnposPd 
on a person h.\' the law, not in pursuance of his 
intention and agreement, either expressed or ini-
plied, bnt even against his ·will and design, becan:-;(' 
the circumstances lwtwePn the parties are such as 
to render it jnst that the one should have a rig-Lt, 
and the other a conesponding liahilit_\r, similar to 
those which ·wonld arise' from a contract h(•t\n•t•n 
tll<·m. This kind of obligation therefore rests on 
tlH' principle that ·whatsoever it is certain a i:ian 
011ght to do that the law will suppose him to kl':<' 
promised to do. And hence it is said that, whil« 
thP liahility of a part_\- to an express contncrt 
[tris(·~~ directly from the contract, it is jnst tlH• l'<'-
versP 1n the cmw of a contract 'implied in bv:,' 
th<' contract t]J('l'C' ]wing· impliPd or arising frn::1 
tlw !in.hi lit:.'." Bliss 1'. H mtf, 70 Yt., G:14, 41 A. 10'...'.\:: 
Kel'ulil 'I'. Brou·11,.nrr'~ 11dm'r, '.2:11 K_\'. :108 :.!1 
N. \\y. :..!<i 4;)0. 4(i:1. 
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"But ohligtions of this kind are not properly 
contracts at all, and should not be so denominated. 
There can be no true contract without a mutual and 
concnrrt>nt intention of the parties. Such obliga-
tions are more properly described as 'quasi con-
tracts.'" Union Life Ins. Co. v. Glasscock, 270 Ky. 
750, 110 S.\¥. 2d 681, 686, 114 A.L.R. 373. 
'I1lw facts of this cas(~ qualify under the foregoing 
ddinitions of implied contracts and support the finding 
of t!JP low<'r court in that regard. 
POINT II 
A PROVISION IN THE LEASE GRANTING DEFEND-
ANT THE OPTION TO TERMINATE THE LEASE UPON 
GIVING 30 DAYS' NOTICE AND PAYMENT OF ONE 
i;IONTH'S RENT TOGETHER WITH THE OTHER PRO-
\'ISIONS OF THE LEASE INCLUDING THE ADDITION OF 
PARA GRAPH 24 AND THE OTHER FACTS SURROUNDING 
THIS OCCURENCE CONSTITUTE LACK OF CONSIDERA-
TION AND MUTUALITY SO AS TO RENDER THE ENTIRE 
LEASE NULL AND VOID. 
At first blush the Keck v. Brookfield case, 409 P.2d 
:;s:3, ~ Ariz. App. 424 ( 19GG), would appear to be in point; 
l1owev(·1·, there is a \·ery material element in which that 
('a~e is clistingnishable from the present case. The dis-
tinguishing factor is set forth in the facts at page 584 as 
fo \ \ ()\n-: : 
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"On June 1, 1953, J. N. Brookfidd and Hnth 
Brookfield, husband and wife, and Bnstl•r Jenkins 
and Dorothy Jenkins, husband and wife, l\'Ssees, 
<'X<'cuted a lease agrePment with l\fr. and Mrs. 
Dorris, as lessors. rrlw leaso 1vas for a one year 
period ending on June 1, ] 954. It prnvided that 
the $1,500.00 rent be paid in monthly installments 
of $125.00 and granfrd to tl10 lessee an option 
to n•1w1\' the' l\~asc~ on tlrn same terms for an addi-
tional 20-year period upon the giving of proper 
notic<>. Tlw l<>asPd I>rPrnises wen• deserilwd as 
· ... that cPrtain ham locatPd at 2552 Orn<'I<' Road, 
Pima County, Arizona.' 
"On FPhrnary 26, 1954, .T. N. Brookfield, 
Lester .Jenkins and the Dorrises, in each other's 
presencP, signed their names in the right-hand 
margin of the lease dated June 1, 1953, for the 
purpose of giYing effect to the following written 
addition to the instnmwnt rnadP at that tinw hy 
.T. N'.Brookfield. 
" · F'<•hruary 2(i, 195-l, it is agrec"cl by all sip;-
natnres attachPd that this lt>ase shall run for thC' 
20-yPar period stated above and that the lessees 
can renJk(• said lease at the end of an:-' given year 
hy gfrin~ a 30-day writt('n noticP.'" 
Tlwrdon• it is se\'n that tlw option to renew in the 
K rck case was PxecutPd h:--· all parties to it and became 
an exeentPd ratlwr than an \'Xecutory coYenant. For this 
reason th<• lnek of rnutnality, if any, wl1ich may haw 
c•xisted was e01Teded. 
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"Alleged defective mutuality applies only to 
executory contracts and it does not apply to an 
<>x<'cuted contract nor to the executed portion of a 
contract." In re Titrner's Estate, 341 P.2d 376, 
171 C.A. 2d, 591. 
Tlw District Court's holding in the instant case re-
lated to the lack of mutuality as to the option to renew 
togdlwr with other surrounding circumstances. The op-
tion to renew was exPcntory and as such could be stricken 
down as larking in mutuality as to that aspect of th<:> con-
tract. 
'l'he doctrine of mutuality is closely related to the 
doctrine of lark of consideration and both of these ele-
nwnts have lwen codified in the present Uniform Com-
111ereial Cod<> which provides in 70A-2-302 as follows: 
"UnconscionablP contract of clause. - (1) If 
the court as a matter of law finds the contract or 
anv clause of the contract to have been unconscion-
abie at the time it was made the court may refuse 
to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the re-
rnaindPr of tlw contract without tlw nnronscionable 
clause, or it may so limit the application of any 
nnconscionahlt> clansf' as to avoid any unconscion-
ahlP r<>snlt. 
''(2) ·when it is claimed or appears to the 
court that the contract or any clause thereof may 
lw nneonscionable the parties shall be afforded a 
n•asonahle op1)0rtnnity to present evidence as to 
its co111111ercial setting, purpose and effect to aid 
the r011Tt in making- th<> <10t<'rmination." 
24 
It is the position of the plaintiff that the contract 
·was unconscionable at its commencement for the reason 
for the wrongful adding of paragraph 24; however, the 
contract was ratified h.'- its n•cognition by both parties 
over a period of Yl'ars. However, this ratification only 
hecanw effective as to tlw paragraph and created the con-
tract aftPr the date the U niforrn Commercial Code became 
effectin~ on DecPmher 31, 1965, and as snch it is suggested 
that the provision::; of thP l:nifonn Commercial Code 
should be applied to gowrn tlw instant interprdation of 
the option to rPnew. In this case the entire contract must 
he reviewed with n•spect to the issue of lack of mutuality 
and particular attention 11rnst be given to the unilateral 
addition of paragraph 24 hy the lessee. In this respect it 
must be recalled that it 1rns the undisputed tPstirnony of 
the plaintiff that the defendant throughout the continued 
existence of the contract claimPd and re-affirmed that an 
allm\-ance "-onld lw madP for the increased value of the 
property as a result of the construction of the station and 
a contribution of $20,000.0() made hy plaintiff's pre-
dPcessor in em1fonnity with the requireuwnts imposed hy 
paragraph 2-l of the least>. rl'he addition of this paragraph 
imposed a substantial additional hnrd<'n n1JOn the lessor 
1d1ich was eompli(~d with h,\- the lt>ssm· suhject to the 
eondition that the additional rPntals 1w pai<l. 1'his ksti-
rnony w(·nt urnlispHt<•d and was Jll'<'Sl'nted in that context 
lit>fore th<• lowe>r conrt and in viPw of tltP addition of this 
clans<' an into!<•rahl<> lmrd<'n was placvd upon th<~ ks~or 
and then· \'."a" iJld(•<>d a laek of imttlw.lit,\· w]H•n thl' eontrad 
wac; Yi<·w<>d in its <·niird\·. 'i'lii~ r·o1Hlition of lack of 
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mutuality was compounded by virtne of the facts support-
ing the first })Oint of tlw brief herein, that is, that there 
was actually a contract not to rene·w the option. There-
for<', if an>· mutuality existed it was to the effect that 
tlw contract embodied in the lease in its total contained 
a el ear understanding that the ovtion to renew ·was in-
<'ff Pdin. 
The plaintiff must readily agree that the mere fact 
that tlw ddendant had the option to cancel the lease 
upon µ:i\·ing :m da>·s' notice was insufficient in and of 
itself to crt>ate a lack of mutuality so as to void the lease. 
'rlwre is a small minority of cases to the contrary and 
most courts construing the question have considered it a 
ratlwr close one. Plaintiff basically agrees with the 
assertion in this rt>gard set forth in Point II of defend-
na t's hrid wliert>in it cites 17 Corpus Juris Secu-ndurn, 
Section 100. Mort> particularly in point is Volume 51C, 
Cm'}ms J1rris 8ec1111dnrn, Section 91, quoted as follows: 
"Although a lease for a term of years cannot 
he terminated at the option of one of the parties 
in the absence of a provision thert>of, the lease may 
provide for its termination before the expiration of 
the term fixed at the option of either of the parties 
to the lease agreement. It has been held that 
whether such an option exists, and, if it exists, 
·whetlwr it may be t>xercised by either of the par-
ti(•s, or solt~ly by the lessor, or the lessee, depends 
on the krms of the particular lease. An agreement 
is not invalid although it gives the lessor or the 
less<>E' alonE' the right to t0nninat<> tlw lease. 
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''Under Missouri law, a filling station lease 
has been held not invalid for lack of mutuality, not-
withtstanding the provision giving the lessee the 
option to cancel the lease at any time after giving 
30 days' notice to the lessor, the court holding 
that the payment of the stipulated rPnt was suffi-
cient consideration for the cancellation clause." 
Bowen 1;. Shell Oil Co. (D. C. Mo.) 71 Fed. Supp. 
649. 
The court pointed ont that this is the majority posi-
tion bnt that wherever the quPstlon has hPen constrned 
it is a very close question and that the balance of the lease 
provisions mnst lw inqnired into. 
'l1 lw plaintiff's position stated in its simplest terms 
·with respect to the issue of mutuality is that the unilateral 
addition of the 24th Jmragraph imposing upon the lessor 
the burden of contributing $20,000.00 to the construction 
of the sPrvic<, station and the promise by the lessee that 
it \vould not renew the leasP combined with repeated oral 
statPments to the eff Pct that additional amounts would br 
imid to tliP lessor in accordance with the reasonable valu-
ation of the impro,·ernents of the sc'n-ice station com-
ple't<->l>- cle:;tro:·s tlw mntnality of the agreement in view 
of tlw lesseP's condnct with res1wct to all issues and 
particnlarl:- in YiC'w of its failure to pay additional sums 
\dwn cornhiiw<l with tl1P option to tPrrninat<'. 
Th\' rnlt:on of rnntuality it; closl'l:· related to the 
tli<'or:1· of ronsideration and the' smnu fad situations have 
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h«Pn construed in different cases under these separate 
}t(~adings. (Williston on Contracts, Y ol. 1, Sec. 501A.) 
'l'his position is also set forth by James in his text Op-
tirm Contracts, Section 117, as follows: 
"A contract covering a period of time but con-
taining the condition that it may be terminated 
before that time, will remain effective for the full 
term, unless the condition of termination is fully 
eomplied with. \Vhere, therefore, a particular 
noticl~, or a specified time, is required to make the 
notice effrctivP, a notice not conforming to the 
contract, or not given at the time specified, does 
not have the effect of terminating the contract. 
"With reference to mutuality, it would seem the rule 
is that unless the option to terminate the contract 
is reserved to either party, it is lacking in that es-
sential. Thus, a contract between a railroad com-
pany and a telephone company which gives the 
latter the privilege of placing telephones in two 
depots, of the former, in consideration of free tele-
phone service for it, but subject to termination at 
the will of one, 'vith the stipulation that no corres-
ponding right shall be exercisPd by the other, lacks 
mutuality." 
It is therefore the position of the plaintiff that al-
though the contract itself did not lack mutuality as a 
l'Psult of the option to renew for a total lease period of 25 
> 1•ass while the lessee could terminate at any time, the 
r·ovenant allowing the option to renew was not supported 
hy consideration and therefore the option itself could not 
he exercised although the prime term was a valid rental 
JlPriod. 11he eases construing the issue apply to the prime 
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term and do not involve tlwmselves with the question of 
the validity of the option to r<>new. Cases construing the 
issue which state that th(' contract does not lack mutual-
ity as a n'snlt of the right to tPrminate on the part of the 
lessee are not in point lwre because it is the plaintiff's 
claim that the covenant itself lacks mutuality; therefore, 
although the plaintiff admits the leasl' for the prime 
term was not drstroyed h? lack of mutuality, it is sug-
gPsted that tlw covenant for tla• option to renew is invalid 
for that reason inespectiv<> of tlw other facts presrnt 
in the case. 
In Volume 51 C of Corpus J?tris Sccundmn, under 
Landlord and Tenants, at Sections 91 and 92, it is pointed 
ont that where an option does exist in the lessee to ter-
minate the contract pursuant to notice this clause will Le 
constnwd most strongl~- against the lessee. In smmnary 
it is the position of the plaintiff that the lower conrt \\·as 
corrt>ct in ruling that tlH' h'ase lacked nrntnality in view of 
all tlw fadorn prPsPnt combined with the fact that it was 
terminable by thP lPss<'P in :10 days and particularly that 
th<> option to n•nPw was nlid lwcarnw it lack<'d nrntnality. 
POINT III 
THERE IS Al\IPLE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A FIND-
ING OF AN Il\IPLIED COVENANT TO INCREASE RENTAL 
OR SHARE PROFITS UNDER THE LEA.SE. 
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'l'ltis point is largely a question of fact not law and 
the facts to support this contention are set forth at length 
in the stat('llH'nt of the facts and the legal implication of 
thL'Se facts hav(~ largely heen discussed under Points I 
and II. In Yiew of the addition of paragraph 24 and of the 
uncontrovertcd oral represL'ntations testified to by the 
plaintiff herein to the effrct that on numerous occasions 
hotli hefor0 the contract was entered into and throughout 
it:-; <'Xisknc0 the defrndant's agents and representatives 
i11<lil'at(·d that an additional amount of rent would he paid 
in aceo1·da11ee with tl1P increased Pvalnation of thP prop-
Prty based upon the contribt:tion of the $:20,000.00 h~· the 
lessor in addition to the other requirements imposed ini-
tially under the lease and in view of the increasing prop-
erty Pvaluation as a result of inflation and population 
increase in the area in question. The lower court would 
not hav0 needed to rest its findings upon the theory of im-
plied contract but would have been well within its discre-
tion to have found an express covenant to the effect that 
an increase in rental or a share in the profits did exist 
under the contract and that the lessee had breached its 
ohligation in this regard. Defendant's quote from the 
Cousins case in connection with this case clearly sets forth 
the applicable law with respect to implied covenants. The 
plaintiff accepts it, agrees with it and suggests that it 
l'l'quires that this Court affirm the lower court's holding. 
'11lw contract itself provided for a lease payment in the 
amount of $300.00 l)er month and the depositions demon-
strate that this was not sufficient to make the payments 
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at the bank on the $200,000.00 loan and to pay the prop-
erty taxes and irnmrance on the pro1wrty in question. At 
page 13 of hPr dPposition the plaintiff stah'd: 
". . . $2G5.25 went to ·walker Bank to repay tlH· 
loan taken out to furnish the con:struction money 
to build the service station for General Petrolem1;. 
It took frn years to pay off the Joan. 
Q. Right. That was a loan tahn out h~- yonr 
mother, is that correct? 
A. For the construction money to build the 
sernce station to put General Petroleum in busi-
ness. 
Q. Did you have any thing to do ·with the 
Joan 1 That is, were you a signer or-
A. No. 
Q. Strictly in your motlwr's name? 
A. YPs. 
Q. X ow, what happt>ns to thP balance of that 
money? 
A. Tlw $3-1.75 halanc<~ was s<'nt to m~- mother 
for sonw time and that wasn't <'V<'n ('nongh to pay 
taxes on the propr·rt~-. So I was having tronhlr 
g<>t ting· tliP tax('S 1 la id, so finally all of the money 
was S('nt to \Yalk('l' Bank. 'T'l1(')' sf't np a tax Pi'-
crow ·with this ad<litional mmwy." 
1 
c 
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The only reasonable and logical conclusion to he drawn is 
that the parties clearly intendl~d that there would he some 
consideration flo\\·ing to the kssor and the only possible 
profit which could haYe eminated to the lessor in con-
1wction ·with this transaction would have b<~en a payment 
of so11w additional amount abon the $300.00. All the 
mo1wy borrowed from tht> hank went into the service sta-
tion construction and it was necessary for the lessor each 
month to conw up with additional money sufficient to 
llH'Pl tlH· insurance and property taxes as they were amor-
tiz<'ll. l t \\'<Hild ht> 11nthinkahll' to conclude that it was the 
intention of fop parfa's that the Jessel'< should pa>' a total 
n'ntal pa>·ment in the amount of $300.00 per month to 
thP lessor, that the lessor should take that amount, pay it 
to the hank for the improvements being used by the lessee, 
and pa>· additional mone~· out of her pocket each month 
for taxes and insurance so the lessee could operate a 
profitahlt> service station upon the leased premises and 
n·tain all profits derived therefrom. 
rr lS 'l'HE POSITION OF THE PLAINTIFF THAT 
THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN PLAINTIFF'S 
FAVOR GRANTED BY JUDGE HANSON SHOULD 
Bl£ UPHELD. HOW'EVER, IN THE EVENT THAT 
l '11 1 S REVERSED THE PLAINTIFF THEN ASKS 
THAT THE COURT REVERSE JUDGE ELLETT'S 
J·;~\RLil'.JR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND RELIES ON 
'l'Hlj~ FOLLO"WING POINTS TO SUPPORT THAT 
I 'OSI'l:'ION: PLAINTIFF SEEKS A JUDGMENT IN 
lU~R FAVOR OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE A NEW 
'l'HTAL ON ALL TSSeES. 
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POINT IV 
THE CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENT ENTERED IN-
TO BETWEEN SOCONY MOBIL OIL COMP ANY AND E. E. 
TERRY WAS AN ASSIGNMENT OF SOCONY MOBIL OIL 
COMP ANY'S LEASEHOLD INTEREST WHICH OPPOSED 
THE CONDITION THAT ONLY THE ASSIGNEE, E. E. 
TERRY, COULD VALIDLY EXERCISE THE OPTION TO 
RENEW. 
The property which is the subject of this lawsuit was 
leased to General Petroleum by Lavine IL White on Aug-
nst 17, 1954, for a period of 120 months (Plaintiff's Ex-
hibit No. 1). The defendant commenced occupancy of the 
premises on May 1, 1955 (R. 60). The defendant, Socony 
Mobil, leased the premises in question to one E E. Terry 
for a three-year term commencing the 1st day of Septem-
ber, 1963, and continuing through the 31st day of Angnst, , 
1966 (R. 63, G4). 
1]1e lease agn'emPnt between Mobil and Terry incor-
porates the dPal<:>r's contract ~which provides at paragra]Jh 
11 (R G4) as follows: 
"Helationship of parties. It is the intent of 
the parties that dealer's statns shall be that of an 
inde1wnclent business man, and that neither dealer 
nor any of dealer's Prnplo~·eps shall lw employees 
or a_g(•nts of l\[olii 1 ... " 
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'rhe lease does not contain any right of re-entry except 
in the event of a breach of any applicable provision con-
tained tlwrein. 
There was no attempt by E. E. Terry personally or 
through any person who was his agent to exercise the 
option to renew which '.Vas contained in the original lease 
between La\·ine "Whitt> and General Petroleum, which i8 
tlw lease in question in this case. Under any view of the 
fadH in thi8 case, that lease expired at the very latest 
on Ma:< 1, 19115. 
'l'he demise from the defendant to E. E. Terry was 
for a period approximately 15 months beyond the prime 
term for which Mobil held the premises. The legal ef-
fect of this transfer was an assignment by the defendant 
of it8 entire leasehold interest which divested Mobil Oil 
of its right to extend its lease with plaintiff herein. In 
tlte case of Stewart v. Long Island Railroad Company, 
102 N.Y. GOl, 8 N.E. 200, 55 Am. Rep. 844, Judge Rapallo 
said: 
"vVhere a lessee of land leases the same land 
to a third party, the question has often arisen 
whether the second lease is in legal effect an as-
signment of the original lease, or a mere sub-lease . 
. . . The rule is well settled that if the lessee parts 
with his whole term, or interest as lessee or makes 
a lease for a period exceeding his whole term, 
[ t~mphasis added] it will, as to the landlord, 
amount to an assignment of the lease, and the es-
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snnce of tlw i1rntnnnent as an assip;nnwnt so far a~ 
the original lessor is co11C('l'nPd, will not lw dP-
stl'oyecl hy its n'S('lTing a n<'w n·11t to the assignor 
with a pow<'r of r<•-entPring for non-pa~1nent." 
Law to the ~mtlH' <'fi'eet is found in Tiffai1,11 ui1 Real Prop-
erty, Section 4S, pag«' 114, quotPd as follows: 
"A gnrnt of the entirP inh•n•st remammg ill 
tlw ksst>(' in Pitlwr the 1d10IP or part of tlH~ in·e111-
ises 11·ill constitute an assigmrn·nt to tlw grnntP(', 
so far as the landlord is concerned, en•n though th 
instnunent purported to lw a lease, or a diffrn·nt 
rPnt lw n•s<•rved. . " 
A casP in point is (irotli r. Co11fi11eJ1fol Oil Cmnzmny, all 
Idaho ease of 1 %2 found at :37:1P.2<154S. Th<> eonrt stat('d 
at ]Jag(' 550 as follm\·s: 
'· ·\Yi 111 l i tll<· di s~wnt, thP gern•ral rnle S<'<'lll~ 
\Yell settl<•d that a transfer of a tPnant's entire in-
terest, in a part of demis<•d pr<•rnises for th(' re-
rnainder of tit<' t<Tm constitub·s an assignment pro 
tnnto ratlwr tlian a snhl<'as<', at least as lwhre<•11 
th(• lamllonl and tlw transf<·n'<'.' 
"Conoco ('Ollt,·;~{b tlwt the option to renew, 
eonhti1wd in its l<'ns<' from \\'ilkic>, lw<l the cffeet 
or exten<linµ; tlw 11·rrn for th· fnll 10 YPHl'S ]Wl'lllit-
frd h>" tlH· tPnns of the option; tl111s it held a long·(•J' 
frrn1 ilmn tliat. 1\·liich it grnn\<·d 1o \Vilk(' in tl 1<' 
i<':l:-:c 11<1r·k: 1La1 i1 t11<•J' ·f'oi<' ]1old :1 n·\·ersionnn· 
ini"J ••: i in tl (' l: ~'" ·-l:n!d, nn1~ i h· l1·:1~T-liack cnnl:l 
no1- qi ):'r:1 t<· .~1:-' :111 ~~:::-: ·:-~LfJ!( ~1 i. 
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"'l'he provision involvPd is a conditioned op-
tion, for renewal, not a covenant to extend the 
term. As such it is merely an offer, and does not 
convt>y to, nor invt•st in, the optionee a present 
estate in the land, until it is exercised. Gard v. 
Thompson, 21 Idaho 485, 123 P. 497; Cicinclli v. 
Iwasaki, 170 Cal. App. 2d 58, 338 P.2d 1005; 51 
C .. J.S. Landlord and Tenant, ~ 54, 56. Cf. Murray 
v. Odman, 1Wash.2d 481, 96 P.2d 489. 
"The option in this case is limited and condi-
ti01wd b>· the clause, 'provided Lessee exercises 
t'aid option by giving LPssor writtPn notice of such 
intent at k·ast GO days prior to tlw termination of 
this lease.' No estate or interest in the property 
could pass until the conditions of the proviso were 
fnll>· complied with." 
It is of no importance that Mobil Oil termed their lease 
instrnnwnt to Terry a lease or sublease, for the deciding 
factor is the legal relationship created by an instrument 
which grants to a third party a longer term than the sec-
ond 11arty holds. N eitlwr words, form, conditions or cove-
nants prC'vented the transfer of Mobil Oil's leasehold 
Pstate when, by their ovrn contract, they put a third party 
into their position. In Craig v. Sitmmers, 47 Minn. 189, 
40 N.\V. 742, 15 L.R.A. 236, it was held that whether or 
not an assignment of a lease had been made is a question 
of tlw lPgal effect and not of the form of the instrument. 
In the casP of Holden v. Tidwell, 133 P. 54 (Okla.) 
llH• court sta t~'s: 
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"The language employed or form used by tli1:1 
parties in interest does not necessarily determine 
the character of the instrument or the relation ere. 
ated thereby. The fact that a transfer may be in 
form a sublease or that it reserves rights again~t 
the transf f'rees similar to such as ordinarily re-
served in a lease is, as a gf'neral rulf', immatf'rial." 
American Lau: of ProzJrrty, Yolnme 1, Section 3.57, 
at page 297, stat<1 s as follows: 
"In determining ·whether a given transfrr is a 
sublease or an assignment, the court in the major-
ity of the cases, has said that the retention of the 
reversion is necessary to the creation of the land- ' 
lord and tenant relation and held that the transfer 
hy the lessee of his right to possession for the 
duration of this tf'rm is an assignment." 
By transferring the leasehold estate for a longer 
period than it held, and thus not retaining a reversion, , 
Mobil Oil assigned its lease. The assignment transferred 
all the interest held hy J\Johil Oil, le~wing it ·without any 
privity of estate. 
:3:2 American Jnrisprnrlence, Landlord and 'l1enant, ' 
8<,ction i\18, at page 29:~, stat<'s: 
"A ](jssee dnri11g his occupancy of the demised 
premises, holds both l1~T privity of estate and of 
contract. "When lie assigns his l<'ase, he divest~ 
liims(']f of the priYi~y of <·stat<', altllo-;.1gh not of 
contract." 
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rJ1he assignm('nt transferred and set OV<:'r the lease-
hold interPst from Mobil Oil to Terry. Terry was an inde-
1wndent contractor and was not an agent of Mobil nor was 
Tvfohil an agent of Terry. Therefore, Mobil Oil effectively 
di\·ested itsPlf of snch leasehold interest and no longer 
being the kss('e, it had no ownership nor did it possess 
any right to exercise the option paragraphs. The attempt-
ed Pxercise h~· l\fobil Oil of the option clause was of no 
pf'frct for as an indqi('ndent contractor ·with respect to 
1\·n:-· and having divested itsplf of its entire estate it no 
lollg'!'l' had a kgal relationship Pntitling it to so Pxercise 
the option. ln Gill)('rt i·. l'an Kleeck, 132 N.Y. Supp. 2d. 
580, the con rt ruled: 
"The assignment carried with it the option 
to purchase even though there was no express ref-
erence in the assignment to the option. An option 
to purchase is a covenant running with the land 
and the benefit of the covenant passes to an assign-
('e of the lease without specific mention." 
rl1he plaintiff, therefore, seeks a reversal of Judge 
Ellett's ruling in this connection and requests a ruling of 
this Honorable Court that Mobil could not exercise the 
option to renew for the reason that E. E. Terry had been 
assigned the right to do so and he was the only person 
capable of exercising that right. Such a ruling would 
1weessitate a ruling by the Court that the lease was not 
renewed and that the plaintiff is entitled to the damage 
,jnd;..,r:111Pnt and an immediate order of occupancy. 
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POINT V 
NO PROPER NOTICE WAS GIVEN BY MOBIL FOR THE 
REASON THAT NO ACTUAL NOTICE WAS RECEIVED BY 
THE PLAINTIFF NOR WAS NOTICE SENT TO THE AD-
DRESS DESIGNATED IN THE LEASE. 
ri'lJe lJlaintiff in tJii:::; COTIJH'Ction S('Plrn a detPl'lllination 
lJy tlii:::; Court that no noticP was gi\·pn and tht>n'fore th1· 
lease was not renewed and that the 111aintil'f i:::; <'ntitl('d to 
the damage judgment and to an immediate order of oce11-
pancy. In the alternative, the vlaintiff seeks a ne\\· trial 
on this factual i :::;sne if the Court determin0s that tlie 
plaintiff may haw received notice. 
Respondent contends that with respect to the smn-
mary jndguwnt granted against her on the issnt> of 
whether or not slit> received actual notice ·was im1iroper 
for the rPason that the e\·id,·nce of record clearl;,, shmr> 
that slw did not recein notice of any option ('X<'reised hy 
Pither Mohil Oil or rrPrT>" and tlwreforp thP original leasv 
terminatPd hy ib own tPrm:::; on .i\.Iay 1, 19G3. At best a 
faetiml dis1:11t<' exists in connection with this point. 
Th<' option paragrnpb, hinp; spcciiicall>· conditioned 
upon noticP to tlw landlon1; lwv<' tlierdore Jl<'\"Pr h<·Pll 
prop<•rl:: <·xneis<·tl h;: :'.\[oliil Oil ~>inc<' tlH· landlord JH":t·r 
n•c<·i\'l•d t11<• 1:0',iC(' l'<'(jl:i1ul hY tb· ill'O\'isions cont~iJtl·d in 
• l 
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ment on its ovvn printed form, and any interpretation 
rnnst, in law, be construed most strictly against Mobil 
and in favor of respondent. 
The original lease, (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1) pro-
Yides as follows: 
"17. Lessee may, at its option, by serving 
notice of its election so to do at least thirty (30) 
<lays prior to the expiration of the term of this 
k•asP, renew or extend this lease for a period of 
sixty ( 60) months upon the same terms and condi-
tions and at the same rental and payable in the 
manner specified in paragraph 1 hereof." 
'l'he evidence is not clear with respect to the question 
as to whetlwr the lease expired for the reason that the 
lrase instrument provides that the lease term would com-
11wnce upon completion of the necessary improvements to 
the real property to allow the lessee to operate it as a 
Rrrvice station (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1). It remains 
the contention of the plaintiff that this completion occur-
rt>d in February of 1955 and that the lease should have 
commenced at that point, and as such the lease should 
have expired in March of 1965; and therefore the notice 
which 'Was given was not timely in any eyent. Repondent 
C'ontt>nds that this question alone presents a suffici<"nt 
factual issne for trial. 
B)' the terms of its own printed lease form, lessee 
pro\·ich•d an address to which it could safely send legal 
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notice to the lessor, her successors or assigns, and further 
lH'Ovided a method by \Yhich this addr<>ss could he 
changed by lessor, succPssor, or assigns, if tlH·y so desired. 
The paragraph rt>ads as follows (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 
J): 
"10. Anv notice from lessee to lessor mav lw 
p;iven by st>n.ding same b~- registered mail· ad-
dressed to lessor at 2833 East Millcreek Road, 
Salt Lake City 5, Utah, and lessor or his success-
ors or assigns may at any time l»· written noticP 
to lessee change the place of giving notice and 
after such writtPn notice to lessee by registered 
mail, lPss<>e shall send all notices intended for 
lessor or his successors or assigns to the addres~ 
which may lw so indicated." 
This notification address has never been changed; therf'-
fore, the Salt LakP City address clearly typed in para-
graph 10 is the place of giving notice under the terms of 
the original lease. Any other seryice of notice sufficient 
to renew th<> least> must he demonstrated by the lesseP 
to havP been actually l'<'<'<'iwd by the lessor 1wrsonally. 
rrhe affidm·it of t]H• dt>frndant herl'in <l<•rnonstrates ' 
conelnsi,·ely to tli<> contrary. 'rhe mail n·ct>ipt was signed 
hy an indi,·idnal who sig·m·d his nmm• D. :'.\I. -White (R 22) 
Tlu• affidavit of plaintiff stat<·d that sh<• had JH'Y<'l' h<'<'ll 
notified b~- a D. _}[. \\'l1it<> of tlw noti('<' and that D. :\!. 
\Yhifr was not an agvnt of h<>I's aml that i-J1e was not in 
Florida at th" addn,ss \\'h('l'<' D. _}f. \\'Lite rec<·iv<>d the 
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notice for a period of six months surrounding the time 
when it was received by the said D. M. ·white. The de-
fendant had the opportunity had it so chosen to take the 
deposition of D. M. White to determine whether or not 
that individual actually notified Doris -White Bagely in 
contravention of her testimony to that effect; however, 
the deff'ndant failed to so depose D. M. White. 
That the notice must actually be received by the 
lr'ssor is a legal postulate supported in numerous cases, 
the following of which is representative: 
Blumenthal v. Atkinson, 93 Ark. 252, 124 S:\V. 510. 
POINT VI 
THE DEFENDANT DID NOT FILE ITS APPEAL IN 
SUFFICIENT TIME UNDER APPLICABLE STATUTES. 
The plaintiff's action was in the nature of an un-
lawful detainer action under the Utah Forcible Entry and 
Detainer Act which provides in 78-38-11 as follows: 
"Time for appeal. - Either party may, within 
ten days, appeal from the judgment rendered." 
This section was construed in the case of Hunsaker 
v. Harris, 109 P.1, 37 Utah 226. The court in that case 
stated: 
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''The time for taking an appeal in a forcibI~ 
entry and detainer suit is governed by this section, 
which is valid, and th(_• general provision providing 
for appeal is not applicahle." 
If the Court finds that the 10-day ttppeal time is not 
applicable, then of course Rnle 73A applies ·which JH'O-
vid(_•s in a1ipliC'ahle part as follows: 
" (a) ·when and how taken. 'Vhen an appeal 
is permitted from a district C'onrt to the Suprenw 
Court, the time within which an appeal may lw 
taken shall be one month from the entrv of the 
judgment appealed from unless a shorte; time is . 
prO\'ided hy law .... " 
Also pertinent in this regard is Rule 72, the 1wrtinent 
_part of which is quoted as follows: 
" (a) From final judgments. An amwal may 
he taken to the SuprPlllP ,Court from all final judg-
mPnts, in arrordanre with tlwse n1les; ... " 
']'he question thPn arises as to when the final judg11wnt 
was enterPd and whrtlwr or not the appPal was filed with-
in the> approJH'iat<-> tinw ]ll'O\'id<'d hy Pither of the fore-
going statutes. 
J11<lge Hanson's judgllwnt and deerPe were signed 
and enten~d on the 18th dn~- of D(•cemht~r, 19G7 (R. 18S). 
']'his was a final judgrn(•nt as to tlH· issnl's of lialiility. 
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1'he only question reserwd for trial was the amount of 
damagl'S. Trial was subsequently held and pursuant there-
to a judgement was entt•red by Judge Leonard W. Elton 
X overnber 1, 19()8, determining that pursuant to Judge 
Hanson's judgment as to liability damages resulted in 
the amount of $7,517.00 plns costs of court (R. 213). On 
tlw 8th day of' November, 1968, an order was entered by 
.Judge Elton allowing costs and disbursements in the 
mnount of $18.60 (R. 214). The notice of appeal was 
filed ~ ovember 29, 1968, (R. 21 G), which was more than 
ten days after Judge Elton's judgment and subsequent 
order and was more than thirty days after Jndge Han-
f'on's j udgrnent as to liability. Therefore, if Judge Han-
son's judgment was a final judgment or if the ten day 
appc>al time applies, then the appellant has not filed a 
tiind~r amwal and its appeal should be dismissed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated herein, the respondent respect-
ful!~- prays this Court to issue its order: 
1. Dismissing the appeal for the reason that the 
noticP of appeal ·was not timely filed. 
2. In the alternative, to sustain the summary judg-
In<'nt of Judge Hanson, or 
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3. In the alternative, to reverse the summary judg-
ment of Judge Ellett and enter judgment in favor of the 
plaintiff, or 
4. In the alternative, remand the case for a new 
trial on all issues. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SUMMERHAYS, KLINGLE & CORNE 
1010 University Club Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Respondent and 
Cross-Appellant Doris White Bagley 
